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demands of the new subdivision, but that burden is necessary if the costs
of providing land for parks are to be distributed fairly.
DOUGLAS Y. CURRAN

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-NO REVIVAL
OF ALIMONY FOLLOWING AN
ANNULLED "REMARRIAGE"
Glass v. Glass'
Sandra Glass was awarded $183 per month alimony when she obtained a divorce from her first husband, Max. Sandra subsequently married a man named Wedding. Upon learning of Sandra's remarriage,
Max discontinued alimony payments in accordance with Missouri statute. 2 Sandra later obtained an annulment of her remarriage to Wedding
based upon Wedding's fraudulent concealment of his alcoholism. She
requested that Max resume alimony payments and, upon his refusal, had
his wages garnished. This prompted a suit by Max to annul and enjoin
enforcement of the alimony judgment in favor of Sandra. Max alleged
that her marriage to Wedding terminated his obligation to pay alimony
under section 452.075, RSMo 1969. The circuit court denied Max's petition. The Kansas City District of the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the statute does not require a valid remarriage to terminate
alimony; the remarriage ceremony was sufficient.
Statutes in many states including Missouri provide that the remarriage of a supported spouse terminates the supporting spouse's obligation to pay alimony. Whether the annulment of the supported spouse's
remarriage revives the supporting spouse's obligation to pay alimony is a
question which has been frequently litigated in other jurisdictions with a
wide variety of results. Courts confronted with the issue have ranged
from holding that the annulment of a remarriage automatically results in
a revival of alimony payments3 to the adoption of a position that the

1. 546 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
2. § 452.075, RSMo 1969 provides: "[T]he remarriage of the former wife
shall relieve the former husband from further payment of alimony to the former
wife from the date of the remarriage without the necessity of further court action ...

"

3. Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952); Reese v. Reese, 193 So. 2d
656 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69
(1964). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1033 (1972).
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remarriage ceremony alone is sufficient to terminate the obligation of4
the supporting spouse and that a subsequent annulment has no effect.
Some jurisdictions have adopted a middle position: remarriage, whether
valid or not, is one factor to be taken into account in determining if
in circumstances to warrant a modifithere has been a sufficient change
5
cation of the original decree.
In earlier cases courts tended to handle the problem mechanically,
basing their decisions on whether the remarriage was void or voidable.6
A void remarriage was considered not to have been a marriage at all,
and the alimony obligation of the supporting spouse was revived following the annulment.7 On the other hand, there was no revival of
alimony upon the annulment of a voidable marriage,8 because such a
marriage was considered valid while it lasted. This mechanical test
sometimes was qualified by the relation back doctrine, a legal fiction
used to revive the support obligation, even when the remarriage was
merely voidable, 9 by relating the invalidity back in time to the date of
the remarriage. Courts applied the relation back concept to those situations where an equitable result would be obtained. 10 The current trend

4. MacPherson v. MacPherson, 496 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1974); Torgan v.
Torgan, 159 Colo. 93, 410 P.2d 167 (1966); Beebe v. Beebe, 227 Ga. 248, 179
S.E.2d 758 (1971); Keeney v. Keeney, 211 La. 585, 30 So. 2d 549 (1947); Surabian v. Surabian, 285 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1972); Richards v. Richards, 139 N.J.
Super. 207, 353 A.2d 141 (1976); Chavez v. Chavez, 82 N.M. 624, 485 P.2d 735
(1971).
5. DeWall v. Rhoderick, 258 Iowa 438, 138 N.W.2d 124 (1965); Robbins v.
Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961); Boiteau v. Boiteau, 227 Minn.
26, 33 N.W.2d 703 (1948); Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 356 P.2d 279 (1960).
Cf. Ballew v. Ballew, 187 Neb. 397, 191 N.W.2d 462 (1971) (remarriage establishes a prima facie case requiring the court to terminate alimony absent proof of
extraordinary circumstances).
6. Reese v. Reese, 19e So. 2d 656 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Johnson County
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Bach, 189 Kan. 291, 369 P.2d 231 (1962); Minder v.
Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69 (1964).
7. Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952); Reese v. Reese, 193 So. 2d
656 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69
(1964).
8. Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955); Beckett v. Beckett,
272 Cal. App. 2d 70, 77 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1969); Torgan v. Torgan, 159 Colo. 93,
410 P.2d 167 (1966); Evans v. Evans, 212 So. 2d 107 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968); Dodd
v. Dodd, 210 Kan. 50, 499 P.2d 518 (1972); Gerrig v. Sneirson, 344 Mass. 518,
183 N.E.2d 131 (1962); Bridges v. Bridges, 217 So. 2d 281 (Miss. 1968); Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567 (1971); Chavez v. Chavez, 82 N.M.
624, 485 P.2d 735 (1971).
9. Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1974); Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251
N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929); Butler v. Butler, 204 App. Div. 602, 198 N.Y.S.
391, appeal dismissed, 236 N.Y. 642 (1923).
10. Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955); Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567 (1971); Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167
N.E. 501 (1929).
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seems to be moving away from use of this mechanical void-voidable distinction; some courts have explicitly discarded it as irrelevant. 1
More recently, statutory law has been an important factor in the
decisions in this area. In jurisdictions without a statute terminating
alimony upon remarriage, 1 2 if the parties fail to provide in the decree
for the termination of the support obligation upon remarriage, then reference must be made to the statutory provision permitting modification
of support. These modification statutes normally provide that the court
may consider all relevant circumstances to determine whether the remarriage has produced a sufficient change to warrant modification of
the original decree. 13 These statutes allow a more flexible, although less
certain, approach to the issue whether the support obligation should be
revived after annulment of the remarriage.
In states with a statute terminating alimony upon the remarriage of
the supported spouse (or where the divorce decree contains such a provision) courts are apt to confront the revival upon annulment issue by
seeking out the proper meaning of "remarriage."' 4 If the term is incorporated into the decree, courts have looked to the intent of the parties
and of the court granting the decree to interpret "remarriage."'1 5 "[T]he
terms of the enactment itself and the reasons of the lawmaker" are important if a statute is controlling. 16 If it is determined that "remarriage"
refers to a valid remarriage, an annulment would revive the alimony
obligation of the supporting spouse; 17 if a ceremony alone is sufficient
to constitute a "remarriage," then the obligation is not revived by the
annulment of that marriage.' 8 Rarely, however, has a court interpreted
"remarriage" as referring to a valid remarriage when a statute is involved.' 9
Missouri has such a statute, section 452.075, RSMo 1959. Although
the court "inGlass approached the revival issue by interpreting the
statutory term "remarriage, 20 the basis of the decision was really the
11. 546 S.W.2d at 740. See also Beebe v. Beebe, 227 Ga. 248, 179 S.E.2d 758
(1971); Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954).
12. E.g., § 452.075, RSMo 1969.
13. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.64 (West 1966); § 452.370, RSMo 1969.
14. 546 S.W.2d at 740.
15. Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1974).
16. 546 S.W.2d at 740.
17. Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151 (Iowa 1974); DeWall v. Rhoderick, 258
Iowa 433, 138 N.W.2d 124 (1965); Johnson County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
Bach, 189 Kan. 291, 369 P.2d 231 (1962); Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159,
199 A.2d 69 (1964).
18. Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955); Beckett v. Beckett,
272 Cal. App. 2d 70, 77 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1969); Berkely v. Berkely, 269 Cal. App.
2d 872, 75 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1969); Husted v. Husted, 222 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35
Cal. Rptr. 698 (1963); Keeney v. Keeney, 211 La. 585, 30 So. 2d 549 (1947);
Sharpe v. Sharpe, 57 N.J. 468, 273 A.2d 572 (1971).
19. Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69 (1964).
20. 546 S.W.2d at 740.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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public policy seen by the court reflected in section 452.075.21 The Missouri court agreed with the California Supreme Court in Sefton v. Sefton 22 that three factors are important in the decision to deny revival of
alimony following an annulment: the right of the first spouse to rely on
the apparent marital status of his former partner, the lack of standing of
the first spouse to challenge the invalidity of the "remarriage," and the
spouse taking the initiative to remarry
feeling that of the two parties the
23
should bear the consequences.
If revival of alimony were permitted following an annulled remarriage, the supporting spouse might never be sure of his financial status.
Although released from his obligation to pay alimony at the time of the
remarriage, this would be tentative only, subject to revival at any time in
the future if the validity of the remarriage were challenged and overturned. The Missouri court felt that the normal needs of a person to
plan for his future and family require that the supporting spouse be
status of his former partner
entitled to rely on the apparent marital
24
without regard to its actual legality.
The supporting spouse's lack of standing to determine the validity
of his former spouse's remarriage prevents him from taking the initiative
in settling the question of his continued support obligation. The supporting spouse remains vulnerable to the possibility that the supported
spouse will attack the validity of the remarriage. Even then the supporting spouse is barred from participating in the proceedings. On the other
hand, the formerly supported spouse not only has this option open, but
alternative remedies also are available. The formerly supported spouse
may sue for divorce as an alternative to annulment and thus be entitled
to support from the partner of the second marriage. 25 The supported
spouse also may have an available remedy through a suit against the
second partner for loss of support from the supporting spouse. This
may, for example, be based upon the fraud of the second partner which
led to the annulment of the remarriage.2 6 While the supporting spouse
simply must wait for the outcome of the affair, the supported spouse has
an opportunity to rectify this situation if he chooses to act.
The existence of a statute providing that a decree of annulment is
conclusive only as against parties to the annulment proceeding 27 has
been an important factor in cases denying the revival of a support obli-

21. Id. at 742.
22. 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d 439 (1955).
23. 546 S.W.2d at 741.
24. Id. at 743.
25. MacPherson v. MacPherson, 496 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1974).
26. Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 467, 273 A.2d 567, 572 (1971).
27. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 86 (West 1954) (current version at CAL. CIVIL CODE §
4451 (West 1970)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/10
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gation. 28 The courts have reasoned that because the order nullifying the
remarriage was not binding on the first spouse, he could not be held to
the terms of that decree. The first spouse thus would be entitled to rely
on the remarriage to claim that his obligation to make alimony payments
had been extinguished.
Some states, possibly including Missouri, have statutes which allow a
court to grant maintenance awards in annulment proceedings. 29 Such
provisions have been a decisive factor in cases refusing to revive the
support obligation on the theory that the formerly supported spouse can
look to the second marriage partner for support. 30 The absence of such
a statute also has been a factor considered by the courts, 3 1 although the
Missouri court in Glass stated that the existence of such a statute would
be a "separate expression of domestic policy" 3 2 which was not relevant to
the court's decision on the revival issue. The New Jersey Supreme Court
has taken the view that the existence of such a statute is not decisive, but
the court's reasoning was influenced by the fact that the former spouse
has an alternative remedy against the partner of the annulled remarriage: a suit for fraud to recover the loss of support sustained 3
It is possible that Missouri law authorizes the award of maintenance
in an annulment proceeding. The Missouri Divorce Reform Act was
based on The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The comments of the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws indicate that an effort was made
to limit the granting of annulments, referred to as declarations of invalidity, and to provide for a procedure permitting courts to make annulment decrees nonretroactive, because retroactive annulments often
have deprived spouses of financial support and the marital status to
qualify for certain benefits. 34 There are several references in the Mis28. Estate of Gosnell, 63 Cal. App. 2d 38, 146 P.2d 42 (1944); Price v. Price,
24 Cal. App. 2d 462, 75 P.2d 655 (1938); Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App. 2d
48, 116 N.E.2d 185 (1952).
29. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23
(West Supp. 1977).
30. MacPherson v. MacPherson, 496 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1974); Gaines v.
Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954). Compare Gaines with Denberg v.
Frischman, 24 App. Div. 2d 100, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 778,
270 N.Y.S.2d 627, 217 N.E.2d 675, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 884 (1966) and
Herscher v. Herscher, 51 Misc. 2d 921, 274 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1966). In both Denberg and Herscher the courts concluded that the decision in Gaines of necessity
included the premise that it was immaterial that a statute existed granting
alimony in an annulment proceeding. There was a strong dissent in Denberg.
31. DeWall v. Rhoderick, 258 Iowa 433, 138 N.W.2d 124 (1965); Robbins v.
Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961); Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J.
Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69 (1964).
32. 546 S.W.2d at 743.
33. Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 467, 273 A.2d 567, 572 (1971).
34. HANDBOOK OF
FORM STATE LAWS 177

THE NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON UNI-

(1970). Such affected benefits include Social Security and

Workman's Compensation, wrongful death recoveries, and the financial benefit
of property passing as part of the deceased spouse's estate.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 10
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

souri statute to "proceedings for nonretroactive invalidity."' 3 Section
208(e) of the Uniform Act3 6 authorizes the court to treat an annulment
essentially as a substitute for divorce. The decree can be made nonretroactive and the maintenance and property division sections of the Act
would apply just as if a dissolution were being obtained. 37 This section
permitting declarations of invalidity was not adopted in Missouri. It
therefore could be argued that the retention of the term "nonretroactive
invalidity" in the maintenance, property division, and child support sections of the Missouri Act was simply a drafting oversight. It is interesting
to note, however, that the maintenance, property division, and child
support sections of the Uniform Act do not specifically mention declarations of invalidity; 38 the sections on maintenance, property division, and
child support in the Missouri Act specifically include a "proceeding for
nonretroactive invalidity" as an instance in which these types of relief
may be awarded.3 9 In light of this language and the evident intention of
the draftsmen of the Uniform Act to treat an annulment as a divorce, an
argument can be made that maintenance is an available remedy in an
annulment action in Missouri. 40 If so, it would follow that the supporting
spouse should be relieved of his alimony obligation upon the remarriage
of the supported spouse, and support should be sought from the partner in the annulled remarriage.
The Glass court pointed out that by taking the initiative to remarry,
the supported spouse chose to look exclusively to the second marital
partner for future support. 41 Section 452.075 terminates alimony at this
point; the supporting spouse should have no duty to support the spouse
of another. The Glass court saw no justification for a change in the policy of the statute due to a subsequent annulment. 42 The supported
spouse simply may have made a mistake, but the court did not acknowledge a need for such special. protection that the burden of this mistake

35. §§ 452.300, .330.1, .335.1, .340, RSMo (Supp. 1975).
36. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
STATE LAws 188 (1970).
37. Id. at 190.

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-

FORM

38. 9 UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED 490, 493, 494 (1973).

39. §§ 452.330.1, .335.1, .340, RSMo (Supp. 1975).
40. The legislative history of the Missouri Divorce Reform Act sheds little
light on the problem. The Missouri Bar Family Law Committee minutes of
January 23, 1971 indicate that the Committee desired that § 308(a) of the Uni-

form Act be amended to provide for maintenance "to a party who has in good
faith entered into a marriage subsequently declared invalid under § 208." This
was contrary to the Report of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act Subcommittee on § 308(a). Although this change appeared in Senate Bill I of the 76th
General Assembly, it was deleted (as was § 208) from the final version of §
452.335. The reference to "nonretroactive invalidity" was added to Senate Bill 11

and retained in § 452.335.
41. 546 S.W.2d at 743.

42. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/10
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should be shifted onto the first spouse. Indeed, if revival of alimony
were granted, the supporting spouse might be forced to pay alimony for
the period that his former spouse was remarried, thus entitling that
sources of support in the interim between remarriage and
spouse to two
43
annulment.
The arguments in favor of the supported spouse bearing the burden of the consequences of an invalidated remarriage are sound; the
Glass court perhaps was correct in its decision that the supported spouse
was both the most culpable and in the best position to remedy the situation. In most cases, however, the supported spouse will be the nonwage-earning spouse, traditionally the wife. The Glass court's dismissal of
the wife's contention that a strong public policy exists to provide for the
support of a divorced wife44 was perhaps too hasty. Missouri courts historically have viewed alimony in terms of a damage award, as a means of
compensating the spouse for the loss of support by termination of the
marriage. 45 Concern for the support of the divorced wife has been evident in awards of alimony by the courts. 46 Although this damages theory
47
of alimony was discarded by the Divorce Reform Act, evidence still

exists of a continuing strong concern for the provision of support for
the divorced wife.
The requirement of proof of fault and the availability of defenses
that might preclude either party from obtaining a divorce provided an
important bargaining tool for the wife in divorce proceedings under the
old Missouri law. 48 The wife could effectively delay or even prevent a
divorce until an equitable provision for her support was made. The reform act eliminated the wife's leverage with its no-fault concepts. Indeed, much of the opposition to the new act arose out of fear that the
innocent and deserving spouse would be left without adequate financial
support following a divorce. 49 The new law recognized the wife's loss of
bargaining power and provided an alternative avenue for her support

43. Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952); Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d
155, 356 P.2d 279 (1960). This result can be ameliorated by limiting the application of the relation back doctrine to cover only the time after the annulment.
Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N.Y. 366, 167 N.E. 501 (1929).
44. 546 S.W.2d at 743.
45. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066 (En Banc 1920); Ruhland,
Maintenance and Support, 29 J. Mo. B. 516 (1973).
46. Smith v. Smith, 300 S.W.2d 275 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957); Shilkett v. Shilkett, 285 S.W.2d 67 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Phillips v. Phillips, 219 S.W.2d 249
(K.C. Mo. App. 1949); Schulze v. Schulze, 212 Mo. App. 75, 251 S.W. 117 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1923).
47. Ch. 452, RSMo 1969.
48. See Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Property, Divorce, and Death, 28 FLA.

L.R. 1, 6 (1975).
49. Krauskopf, Maintenance: Theory and Negotiation, 33 J. Mo. B. 24, 28
(1977).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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through the property division 5" and maintenance 5 1 provisions, which
give weight to the traditional wife's role as homemaker. 52 If division of
the marital property does not produce an amount sufficient for the
wife's support, the new act provides that she may receive an award of
maintenance based in part on her established standard of living during
53
the marriage.
The court in Glass recognized the partnership concept underlying
the new divorce reform act and noted that the act was designed to make
the spouses equally responsible in their domestic relations. 54 Equality in
responsibility, however, does not mean equality in reality. The traditional
role of women in society has been that of serving the family. As a result,
the typical wife has had no opportunity to develop earning power. The
common case is that the man is able to pay and the woman is in need.5 5
So long as societal roles continue in this respect it will be necessary for
the courts to make provision for the divorced 56wife. If not, the family
and society will have to bear the consequences.
The Supreme Court of Iowa recently reversed a lower court deci57
sion for failure to award alimony to a wife in a divorce proceeding.
The lower court had concluded that, due to the changing philosophy in
alimony awards and the recent social and economic emancipation of
women in society, an award was not justified for a divorced wife clearly
able to provide for herself.5 The supreme court rejected this reasoning
and stated:
There is no evidence before us, nor can we judicially note,
that women have yet achieved social and economic equality with
men. It may be when that nirvana is attained the role of
alimony in the ordinary dissolution case, for either spouse, will
be insignificant. In the meantime, we are not persuaded a 40year-old divorced woman with three minor children in the
home has been so "liberated" it necessarily follows consideration
of alimony is impermissible.5 9
The Oregon Supreme Court has gone a step further by refusing to
permit a dissolution decree to provide for the automatic termination of
spouse support payments unless based on a valid property settlement or

50. § 452.330, RSMo 1969.
51. § 452.335, RSMo 1969.
52. § 452.330.1(1), RSMo 1969.
53. § 452.335.2(3), RSMo 1969.
54. 546 S.W.2d at 743.
55. Krauskopf, Applying the Maintenance Statute, 33 J. Mo. B. 93, 104 (1977).
See also Grove v. Grove, 571 P.2d 477 (Ore. 1977), In re Marriage of Beeh, 214
N.W.2d 170, 174 (Iowa 1974).
56. Krauskopf, supra note 55, at 104.
57. In re Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1974).
58. Id. at 173.
59. Id. at 174.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol43/iss3/10
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prenuptial contract. 60 The court based its decision on the considerations
that women entering a marriage often are led to believe they need develop only domestic skills and that automatic termination would preclude
6
remarriage to persons unable to provide support for them. 1
The Utah Supreme Court has guaranteed support for the divorced
wife in a situation such as the one in Glass by declaring a public policy
which insured the right to support. 62 The divorced wife's right to support also was protected by the New Jersey Supreme Court 3 and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 64 by allowing
revival of alimony following an annulled second marriage. Awards of
maintenance under the new act by lower Missouri courts 65 as well as by
courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes 66 reinforce the fact that
courts recognize the need for continuing support for the divorced
spouse. In light of these strong public policy arguments, it seems unfair
that a spouse who innocently contracts a marriage that is later annulled
should have to bear the consequences when the need for her support is
revived.
Although the decision in Glass rested its policy considerations on
the philosophy put forth in the new dissolution law, it seems to run
contrary to the basic objectives of the Act. The Commissioners on

60. Grove v. Grove, 571 P.2d 477 (Ore. 1977).
61.
Public policy does not require that a woman whose first marriage has
been dissolved be free to remarry only if her new husband is able to
support her ....
We will not ignore the fact that, at least until recent years, young
women entering marriage were led to believe-if not expressly by
their husbands-to-be, certainly implicitly by the entire culture in which
they had come to maturity-that they need not develop any special
skills or abilities beyond those necessary to homemaking and child
care, because their husbands, if they married would provide their financial support and security. We cannot hold that women who relied
on that assurance; regardless of whether they sacrificed any specific
career plans of their own when they married, must as a matter of
principle be limited to the standard of living they can provide for
themselves if "employed at a job commensurate with [their] skills and
abilities." The marriage itself may well have prevented the development of those skills and abilities.
Id. at 485-86.
62. Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 158, 356 P.2d 279, 281 (1960).
63. Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69 (1964).
64. Sutton v. Leib, 199 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1952).
65. Butcher v. Butcher, 544 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Cain v.
Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976); In re Marriage of Powers, 527
S.W.2d 949 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
66. In re Marriage of Sharp, 539 P.2d 1306 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); In re
Marriage of Beeh, 214 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1974); In the Matter of Cupp, 539
P.2d 1120 (Ore. Ct. App. 1975).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
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Uniform State Laws stated that one of the underlying purposes of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, from which Missouri adopted its
law, was "to mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of legal dissolution of marriage ....," The

real objective should be protection for both parties involved.68 The decision in Glass protects the supporting spouse, the husband, but accords
too little weight to the policies behind ensuring support for the supported spouse, the wife, and consequently leaves her to fend for herself.
It has been suggested that justice best could be served by giving the
trial judge discretion to revive the support obligation.6 9 Evidence of detrimental reliance by the supporting spouse would be balanced against
evidence of need and the absence of collusion in the annulment proceeding. Although this method would avoid some of the inequities to the
supported spouse present in the Glass decision, its uncertainty And varied application would promote more confusion in an already troubled
area.
Perhaps the best remedy available is a statutory provision comparable to those in effect in New York and New Jersey which permit a court
to award alimony or maintenance in an annulment action. 0 This would
free the supporting spouse of his obligation as of the date of the "remarriage," whether it is in reality valid or not, yet provide a means of
support for a needy spouse. The amount of support available from the
partner of the annulled "remarriage" would be limited because the duration of the marriage is considered by the courts when making maintenance awards, 7 ' but at least an available source would exist. An argument can be made that the current Missouri law provides this remedy.
Until this question is resolved by the courts or the legislature, the best
solution to the problem in Glass rests in the hands of the parties themselves-a definitive declaration in the original dissolution decree on the
course to be taken should a subsequent remarriage be annulled.
LARRY W. BEUCKE
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